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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Rudder/Speed Brake Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The I0A
a-_roach features a _-6p- o_n" a-_l_is of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake
Actuation Mechanism.
The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide
directional control and to provide a means of energy control
during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical
hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These
two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make
a speedbrake. The rudder becomes active at Mach 4.2 and is
assisted by the Reaction Control System (RCS) yaw Jets until Mach
1.0, where the rudder alone becomes the primary yaw control.
Between Mach i0 and Mach 4.2 the speedbrake serves to provide
pitch trim. Between Mach 4.2 and Mach 0.9 the speedbrake is used
to control drag thus energy dissipation. At touchdown the
speedbrake is fully opened to provide nose-up pitch movement to
aid in nose wheel derotation. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation
Mechanism consists of the following elements:
O
O
O
Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of a
hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered
gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears
to provide PDU torque output
Four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU
generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels
Ten torque shafts which Join the PDU to the rotary
actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators
The IOA analysis process utilized available actuator schematics,
limited detailed hardware drawings, and sketches which were
reviewed with the subsystem manager. From this information the
hardware assemblies and components were defined. Each level of
hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and
causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the
effect for each failure mode.
m
Figures I, 2 and 3 present a summary of the failure criticalities
for each of the major elements of the RSB Servoactuator. A
summary of the number of failure modes by criticality is
presented below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and
Functional (F) criticality second.
I
im
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality-.
Number 3_IRJ 3/2R_
3/3
9
TOTAL
38
J
I
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows.
m
i
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number 2/2 J3_IR _ 3/2R[_ TOTAL27I/I J 2/IR12 13
UP
i
Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle
control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid
contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.
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Figure I - RSB ACTUATOR SUBSYSTEM
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Figure 2 - HYDRAULIC VALVE MODULE
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2 •0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing the independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
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2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis ....
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The I0A analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem _
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Rudder/Speedbrake Ground Rules and Assumptions
The RSB ground rules, and assumptions used in this IOA are
defined in Appendix B.I and B.2. There were no subsystem
specific ground rules and assumptions used in this analysis.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Subsystem consists of that
hardware required to provide both directional and energy control
of the Orbiter during entry. The RSB subsystem consists of the
following components.
i • A PDU is made up of two halves which are identical in
makeup and operation: one for rudder and one for
speedbrake. A switching valve determines which of the
three Orbiter hydraulic systems supplies the PDU
electro-hydraulic Servo VLV (E-H Servo VLV). There are
eight E-H Servo VLVs: four in each PDU half. Each half
of the PDU is controlled by four E-H Servo VLVs which
receive commands from four Aerosurface Amplifiers/Flight
Control System (ASA/FCS) channels.
Each E-H Servo VLV receives from its ASA a position
error command which it changes to a hydraulic pressure
command. This is ported to a triplex power valve where
the pressure (secondary Delta P) along with pressures
from the three other E-H Servo VLVs command two valves
that control pressure to three hydraulic motor/brake
assemblies. These motors are used to drive a
differential gearbox which sums all three motor torques
and outputs it to a single drive shaft. The shaft is
connected to a mixer gearbox. The mixer gearbox takes
the drive shaft inputs from both the rudder and
speedbrake channels, mixes them, and outputs them to a
set of four rotary actuators which move the vertical
panels. When the output shafts rotate in the same
direction, the two panels move in the same direction
thus providing rudder control• When the output shafts
rotate in the opposite direction, the two panels move in
opposite direction thus acting as a speedbrake.
For each E-H Servo VLV there is an isolation valve which
will isolate a failed E-H Servo VLV when its secondary
delta P fails the ASA fault detection limits. The
isolation valve can be commanded from the ASA, a crew
keyboard input or an FCS switch taken to off. The crew
can also inhibit an ASA isolation valve command by
placing a FCS switch in the ORIDE position. If a
problem develops within an E-H Servo VLV or its
commanded position is different than the others,
secondary delta P should begin to rise. Each channel
has a secondary delta P transducer (LVDT) which sends
Delta P to the ASA. Once the ASA detects secondary
delta P at or above 2200 PSI for more than 120 msec, it
will send an isolation command to the appropriate
isolation valve which bypasses hydraulic pressure to the
E-H Servo VLV causing i_s Commanded pressure to the
power spool to drop to zero.
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Position from the Rotary Variable Differential
Transformer (RVDT) on the differential gearbox are sent
to the ASA and to the crew displays. Position is not
used by the ASA for failure detection; it is used only
to modify (negative feedback) the position command
generated by the General Purpose Computer (GPC). The
following is a list of the components of the PDU which
were reviewed and analyzed for failure modes•
a. Switching valve
b. Standby Hydraulic Circulation Valve
c. E-H Servo VLV
d. E-H Servo VLV Filter
e. Bypass Valve
f. Secondary Delta P Transducer
g. Triplex Power Valve
h. Hydraulic Motor/Brake Assembly
i. DifferenTial Gearbox
J. Position Transducer
k. Mixer Gearbox
There are four geared rotary actuators which drive the
two aerosurface panels• Commands from the PDU mixer
gearbox are transmitted via two shaft outputs to the two
columns of aluminum drive shafts connecting the four
rotary actuators. Internal gears pick up the drive
shaft inputs and move the brackets that contain the
aerosurface fastening points. The Orbiter fastening
points are fixed, attached to Orbiter structure. Each
rotary actuator is made up of two driver gear
assemblies, a series of satellite gear assemblies, and
two center drum assemblies which drive independently of
each other. Driveshaft rotations in the same direction
will turn the center drums and therefore the aerosurface
fastening in the same direction (rudder control).
Driveshaft rotations in the opposite directions drive
the center drums in opposite directions (speedbrake
control).
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The RSB interfaces with the four ASAs which receive commands via
four FA MDM's from the four GPCs. Crew initiated inputs; Rudder
Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA), Speedbrake Translation
Controller (SBTC), and Rotation Hand Controller (RHC), are
inputed to the GPCs. The crew can turn power on or off to any
ASA channel, can place a FCS channel switch in ORIDE which
bypasses the ASA fault detection circuitry, and send bypass
inhibit commands to the ASA via keyboard entry.
9
The RSB actuation mechanism is physically located in the vertical
stabilizer. The ASAs which provide position commands to the
actuators are located in avionics bays 4, 5, and 6. The Surface
Position Indicator (SpI) provides a gauge type display for the
crew to check aerosurface position. It is located between
Cathode Ray Tubes (CRTs) 1 and 2 on panel FT. The following CRT
displays are available to the crew: GNC System Summary 1 (PASS
and BFS), Spec 53 Entry Control Display, FCS Dedicated Display
Checkout (during OPS 8) and the Caution and Warning (Panel F7)
(FCS Saturation, FCS Channel and Backup C/W Alarm). The two sets
of switches which provide crew inputs to the actuator ASA system
are the FCS channel monitor switches on Panel C-3 and the ASA
power switches on Panels 014, 015, and 016.
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3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 4 shows the RSB PDU block diagram. Figures 5 through 9
show individual components which were analyzed for failure modes.
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Figure 4 - RSB PDU BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure 6 - SWITCHING VALVE
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15
luJ
Ii.._
l'_i 41
m
m
i
i
m
m
m
z
m
m
i
Z
i
i
m
i
i
i
m
I
I
Figure 9 - RSB ROTARY ACTUATOR CUT-AWAY
16
m
m
i
D
i
ww
w
4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the criticalities for the PDU, the components which make up the
PDU, the rotary actuators, and the interconnect drive shafts.
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I Table I
+
Summary of IOA Component Failure Modes and Criticalities I
Criticality(HDW/FUNC)
+
o PDU
PDU Elements
Sw1-[6hing VLV
Recirculation VLV
E-H Servo VLV
Bypass VLV
E-H Servo VLV Filter
Secondary Delta P
Transducer
Triplex Power VLV
Hydraulic Motor/
Brake
Differential Gearbox
Position Transducer
Mixer Gearbox
o ROTARY ACTUATOR
o DRIVE SHAFT
i/i
1
m
m
1
m
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
12
2/IR
2
2
5
i
1
1
1
1
13
2/2
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1
4
3/2R
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3/3
4
2
2
1
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9Total
Total I
+
7
4
2
5
1
2
38
m
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Of the 38 failure modes analyzed, 27 failures were determined to
be PCls. A summary of PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix D
presents a cross reference between each PCI and a specific work-
sheet in Appendix C.
D
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
PDU
Rotary Actuator
Drive Shaft
i/i
I0
1
1
2/IR
13
w
212
m
m
3/IR
2
3/2R TOTAL
25
1
1
I Total [12 [- [ 2 [ - [ [
=
l
I
4.1 Analysis Results - Power Drive Unit
Failures which were related to the PDU as an entity were first
analyzed. Critical failures were due to loss of hydraulic fluid,
gross and slow leaks, and mechanical failures. Noncritical
failures involved redundant heater blankets: a failure of non-
functionally critical components.
Components which make up the PDU were individually analyzed.
Most critical failures of these components included loss of
command signal input, valve failure due to contamination, filter
clogged, loss of hydraulic pressure, mechanical failures in gears
and shafts, and inability to detect failures by the ASA fault
detection circuitry.
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4.2 Analysis Results - Rotary Actuator
Analysis of the actuator indicated that either an open or a jam
in any of the gear trains resulted in loss of the actuator. Loss
of the actuator would result in overloading the other actuators
which would cause loss of vehicle control.
4.3 Analysis Results - Drive Shafts
Critical failures of the drive shaft, shaft fracture, and/or gear
shearing from the shaft, result in loss of drive to or between
the four rotary actuators which results in loss of vehicle
control.
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i0. Sketches, drawings reviewed with subsystem manager
ii. Handouts from preboard reviews 10-10-86
12. SD72-SH-0102-9 Requirements Definition Document,
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
Aerosurface Amplifier
Backup Flight System
Caution and warning
Critical Items List
Cathode Ray Tube
Differential Pressure
Electro-Hydraulic Servovalve
Functional
Flight Aft
Flight Control System
Failure Modes Effects Analysis
Guidance Navigation and Control
General Purpose Computer
Hardware
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Linear Variable Differential Transducer
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
Operational Sequence
Override
Primary Avionics Software System
Power Drive Unit
Rockwell International
Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
Rotation Hand Controller
Rudder Speedbrake
Rotating Variable Differential Transducer
Speedbrake Translation Controller
Surface Position Indicator
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the _6Tlowing
_plifications and additTons.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-o OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_r_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_r_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-_ed end of mfSs_on
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
I
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objectlve accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve--_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at r_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i00--0-_ober 1986, was employe-_-with the
following amp-[ifications and additions•
i ,
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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10.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a iinimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed•
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
z :
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
RSB Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
None.
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DETAILED ANALYSIS
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This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October----J986. Finally, emffects---are entered at--Ehe
_t_ of--each sheet?--_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike)_coUld cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant_hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
I.i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: I/1
MDAC ID: i01 ABORT: I/i
ITEM: POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
FAILURE MODE: GROSS FLUID LOSS (3 SYSTEMS) BETWEEN SWITCH VALVE
AND POWER VALVE MODULES
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: COMPLETE SEAL FAILURE OR RU_ OF SERVO VALVE BODY,
ISOLATION VALVE BODY, AP TRANSDUCER BODY, MANIFOLD LINES, RETURN
LINES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID TO DRIVE HYDRAULIC MOTORS, RESULTS IN
LOSS OF POWER TO DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATORS. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF
CONTROL, AND.
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
GROSS HYDRAULIC FLUID LOSS (i SYSTEM)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES:
JOINTS
HYDRAULIC LINE TO MOTOR RUPTURE, IMPROPERLY SWAGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF THREE REDUNDANT HYDRAULIC MOTOR DRIVES. HYRAULIC
MOTOR BRAKE IS SET ON LOSS OF PRESSUREWHICH LOCKS SHAFT TO
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GE_BOX PREVENTING BACKDRIVE OF OTHER TWO
MOTORS. WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF HOLDING TORQUE FROM THE
MOTOR/BRAKE. OTHER TWO MOTORS WILL BACKDRIVE IF BRAKE DOES NOT
SET (THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE A SMART FAILURE).
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER DRIVE UNIT (PDU)
INTERNAL LEAK
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE SWITCH VALVE SPOOL/SLEEVE, SW VALVE MODULE,
STRUCTURAL JOINTS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ABORT DECISION. THERE IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. HOWEVER, THERE IS ADEQUATE _!_z
POWER FROM THE REMAINING TWO HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS TO DRIVE THE
ACTUATORS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 104 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER
FAILS TO FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILS-ON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
PDU (i)
FILTER (2/1R CHANNEL, 1 SB CHANNEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ....i%B6RT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[NA]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
C [NA ]
CAUSES: RUPTURED FILTER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. THE 15 MICRON FILTER IS SIZED FOR VEHICLE LIFE. THIS IS
CONSIRERED TO BE A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE SINCE NO KNOWN CAUSES
COULD RUPTURE THE FILTER WHICH _SIqATEDAT 4500-PSI.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
105 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER
NO FLOW TO SERVOVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
FILTER (2/IR CHANNEL, 1 SB CHANNEL)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: C_GGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE NECESSARY TO DRIVE
SERVOVALVES. THIS RESULTS IN LOSS OF RSB CONTROL THEREBY
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER _SESSMENT
O_ITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
106 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
HEATER BLAN_T
LOW TEMPE__ SW. C_SED (FAIL TO OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
B_A_O_ HIE_CHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3) HEATER B_KET
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE IHDW/_C .....AB_T HDW/_c _
P__CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_DANCY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES:
FAIL_
CONT_INATION, CONTACTS RUSTED TOGETHER, PIECE P_T
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO_-OVERTEMP (HIGH) B_S CIRCUIT. _D_DANT HEATERS-ONE
HEATER IS ADEQUATE, ........................
_FE_NCES:
i
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HEATER BLANKET
FAILURE MODE: OVER TEMP. SW. CLOSED (FAILS TO OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3) HEATER BLANKET
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER ....
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048 _
CAUSES:
FAIL_
CONTAMINATION , CONTACTS RUSTED TOGETHER, PIECE PART
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE-THREE TEMPERATURE SENSORS WILL VERIFY ACTUAL OVERTEMP
SHOULD TEMP. EXCEED LIMIT, POWER CAN BEREMOVED FROM FAULTY
CIRCUIT. ONE HEATER IS ADEQUATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 108 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HEATER BLANKET
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (FAILS TO ENERGIZE) LOW TEMP SW., HIGH TEMP
SW., BLANKET HEATER ELEMENT
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3) HEATER BLANKET
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: OPEN LEADS, BROKEN HEATER ELEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE-CIRCUIT A & CIRCUIT B ARE INDEPENDENT.
ADEQUATE.
ONE HEATER IS
L
w
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
109 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATER BLANKET
TEMP SENSOR ERRONEOUS READING
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3) HEATER BLANKET
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: OPEN BROKEN WIRE ELEMENT, SHORT IN SENSING ELEMENT
EFFECTS/ TIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSING UNIT ONLY. HEATERS CONTINUE TO OPERATE.
USED FOR DISPLAY ONLY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: ii0 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
iTEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH VALVE
SECONDARY VALVE FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (1)
3) SWITCH VALVE
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 2/ 1R
3/3 TAL: 2/IR
3/3 AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: 2/IR
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAMMED TRANSFER SPOOL, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE IS FAILURE OF SECOND SPOOL TO TRANSFER FROM
2ND STANDBY (PS2) HYDRAULIC SOURCE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF PS2
RESULTS IN LOSS OF RSB _O_TROL=ANDPOTENTIg_LLOSSOF ....
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: iii ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH VALVE
FAILURE MODE: IST VALVE FAILS TO SWITCH ON LOSS OF PRIMARY HYD.
SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3) SWITCH VALVE
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER ....... _ _
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAMMED TRANSFER SPOOL, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. THE SECOND VALVE WHICH IS TIED TO PS-2 WILL SWITCH TO
PROVIDE HYRAULIC PRESS_ TO THE SEROVALVES. HOWEVER A ........
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF PS-2 WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF RSB CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
ll2 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH VALVE
NO OUTPUT FLOW ACTIVE STAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (i)
3) SWITCH VALVE
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: LOSS OF ASSOCIATED HYRAULIC PRESSURE Pp, PSI OR PS2
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. VALVE SWITCHES TO ONE OF THE TWO REMAINING HYDRAULIC
SYSTEMS.
_.... ;_ _ _-: i ii_i _!i_i_i_[!_i;_ ;_ r_ i _ ! i _'_,_'_',,........._ _ _ _i_i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH VALVE
VALVE POSITION TRANSDUCER FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2) PDU (I)
3) SWITCH VALVE
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: LVDT-BROKEN/SHORTED ELECTRICAL LEAD
EFFECTS/RA_O_:
INSTRUMENT LIGHT SHOWS TRANSFER OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM. LIGHT IS
INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION ONLY AND HAS NO EFFECT ON THE SERVO
SYSTEM. A SECOND FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE SWITCHING TO ANOTHER
HYDRAULIC SOURCE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS wO_SHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 114 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYDRAULIC VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS AT NULL OR OSCILLATORY (UNDETECTED BY ASA)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVEASSEMBLY
HYRAULIC VALVE (4R, 4SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAMMED SPOOL (CONTAMINATION), LOSS OF OF SIGNAL TO
TORQUE MOTOR, TORQUE MOTOR FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LOSS OF I OF4 CHANNELS (RUDDER AND/OR SPEEDBRAKE). THERE
IS A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL AFTER LOSS OF ANOTHER CHANNEL. THE
ASA CANNOT FAULT ISOLATE REMAINING CHANNELS IF_ANOTHER FAILURE
OCCURS.
REFERENCES:
C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: HYDRAULIC VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RETURN TO NULL
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
HYRAULIC VALVE (4R, 4SB)
......_RI T ICALI TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER ........
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAMMED SPOOL (CONTAMINATION), LOSS OF OF SIGNAL TO
TORQUE MOTOR, TORQUE MOTOR ?AILS _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 4 CHANNELS (RUDDER AND/OR SPEEDBRAKE). THERE IS A
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL AFTER LOSS OF_OTHER i_, THE ASA
CANNOT FAULT ISOLATE 2 REMAINING CHANNELS IF ANOTHER FAILURE
OCCURS.
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 116 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYDRAULIC VALVE
FAILURE MODE: NO OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT TO POWER VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON ..... SUBSYS LEAD:_R._WILSON .........
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
HYRAULIC VALVE (4R, 4SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
B[F] C [ P]
CAUSES: FAULT DETECTION TRANSDUCER OPEN, OR SHORT CIRCUIT
ELECTRICAL OPEN IN ASA, MOTOR FLAPPER BROKEN.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NONE. LOSS OF 1 OF 4 CHANNLES. THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS
3/IR, HOWEVER THE ASA FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR. TWO ASA FAILURES CAN
CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL IF DETECTED. THE ASA CANNOT FAULT ISOLATE
REMAINING CHANNELS IF ONE FAILS.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE MOTOR ASSEMBLY
MOTOR FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
TORQUE MOTOR ASSEMBLY (4R, 4SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: OPEN/SHORT IN MOTOR WINDINGS, LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM ASA.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LOSS OF 1 OF 4 CHANNELS (RUDDER OR SPEEDBRAKE). THE
HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS 3/1R. TWO ASA FAILURES CAN CAUSE LOSS
OF CONTROL IF UNDETECTED. ASA FAILURE MODE IS 2/1R SINCE ASA
CANNOT FAULT ISOLATE REMAINING CHANNELS IF ONE FAILS.
(SEE MDAC ID. 114)
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB- FLIGHT: _/IR
MDAC ID: 118 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: TORQUE MOTOR ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FLAPPER FAILS TO CLOSE OFF ORIFICE TO DIRECT HYD.
PRESSURE TO SERVOVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
TORQUE MOTOR ASSEMBLY (4R, 4SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ON ORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
c[P]
CAUSES: FLAPPER BROKEN, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 4 CHANNELS (RUDDER OR SPEEDBRAKE). SEE MDAC ID. 116
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
RSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
119 ABORT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SB)
SECONDARY DELTAP TRANSDUCER (4R, 4SB)
LOSS OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (I OF 4 OUTPUTS FROM R OR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
SECONDARY DELTA P TRANSDUCER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: I/R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
211R
2/1R
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER ....
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: OPEN COIL OR LEAD; FAULTY TRANSDUCER, DRIFT, ELECTRICAL
SHORT, OPEN INASA.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : ....
ASA FAILURES CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL IF UNDECTED. ASA FAILURE
MODE IS 2/IS. ASA CANNOT FAULT ISOLATE LAST CHANNELS IF ONE
FAILS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
120 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION VALVE
VALVE FAILS TO ISOLATE BAD SERVOVALVE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
PDU (l)
ELECTRO HYDRAULIC SERVOVALVE ASSEMBLY
ISOLATION VALVE (4R, 4SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAMMED SPOOL, CONTAMINATION, ELECTRICAL OPEN IN
SOLENOID, LOSS OF SIGNAL FROM ASA.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. HVM IS DESIGNED WITH CAPABILITY OF 2 CHANNELS TO OVERRIDE
FAILED UNISOLATED CHANNEL IN HARDOVER CONDITION. FULL CONTROL
AUTHORITY IS MAINTAINED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
RSB FLIGHT: 3/3
121 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION VALVE (1R, ISB)
FAILS OPEN, HYDRAULIC FLUID FLOWS AT ALL TIMES
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (i)
RECIRCULATION VALVE (IR, 1SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION
NONE - NON-CRITICAL BACKUP. FLOW RESTRICTOR IN RETURN LINES WILL
KEEP FLOW AT AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
122 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION VALVE (1R, ISB)
FAILS CLOSED, LOW OR NO HYDRAULIC FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATORS
PDU (I)
RECIRCULATION VALVE (IR, ISB)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATION, BORKEN SPRING, CLOGGED ORIFICE,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - NON-CRITICAL BACKUP. VALVE IS A SECOND BACKUP TO PDU
HEATERS AND_LTNE _TE_S_. DE-_I_P_T_6_ _V_S _ FLIGHT .....
CONTROL SURFACES & CIRCULATES WARM FLUID THROUGH THE ACTUATORS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
123 ABORT:
HDW/_NC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRIPLEX POWER VALVE
FAILS CLOSED/OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ACT. MECH. RSB
PDU (i)
TRIPLEX POWER VALVE (IR, ISB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/F_C- ......... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: SEIZED DUE TO THERMAL EFFECTS, CHIPS IN VALVE
FAILS CLOSED. THERE IS A LOSS OF FLUID TO DRIVE THE MOTORS WHICH
RESULTSIN LOSSOF nmCTION. FAILSOPEN. SOmFACESWILL DRIVETO
STOPS WHICH COULD CAUS_ IN_RNAL DAMAGE WITH SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF _
FUNCTION.
EITHER FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 124 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/1
ITEM: HYDRAULIC MOTOR
FAILURE MODE: MOTOR SHAFT WHICH PROVIDES TORQUE TO SUMMER
DIFFERENTIAL OPEN.
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (i)
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY (3R, 3SB)
HYRAULIC MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: SHAFT SHEARED OR SPLINE SHEARED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A LOSS OF FUNCTION AND A LOSS OF CONTROL WHICH RESULTS IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW. IF A SHAFT TO THE SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL IS
FREE TO ROTATE, THE OTHER TWO MOTORS WILL DRIVETHE BAD SHAFT IN
REVERSE, WHICH CAUSES A TORQUE SPILLOUT SO THAT THERE IS
IS NO OUTPUT FROM THE GEARBOX TO THE MIXER GEARBOX.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
DEGRADED MOTOR OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (I)
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY (3R, 3SB)
HYRAULIC MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: INTERNAL FAILURE (BY-PASS LEAKAGE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE RESULTS IN DEGRADED CAPABILITY ONLY WITH SOME LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY. THE SYSTEM WILL FUNCTION NORMALLY. A COMPLETE
FAILURE OF A MOTOR LEAVES TWO ACTIVE MOTORS WHICH PROVIDE FULL
CONTROL CAPABILITY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 126 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BRAKE (WITH LOSS OF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON ..... SUBSYS LEAD: R_WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
s)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (i)
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAE ASSEMBLY (3R, 3SB)
HYRAULIC BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
B[ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: FRACTURED ACTUATION-SPRING; PRESS_ pLATE, BRAKE PLATE,
SHEARED BRAKE PLATE SPLINE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE (HYDRAULIC MOTOR STILL PROVIDES TORQUE TO DIFFERENTIAL GEAR
BOX). SECOND FAILURE OR LOSS OF PRESSURE OF SAME SYSTEM CAUSES
LOSS OF RSB.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FAILS TO RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (I)
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY (3R, 3SB)
HYRAULIC BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: INTERNAL BY-PASS LEAK FAST PISTON TO RETURN, STUCK
BRAKE, BLOCKED PRESSURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF 1 SYSTEM.
RATE ....
ONE MOTOR OUT - FULL RATE; 2 MOTORS OUT HALF
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIG_:
MDAC ID: 128 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
i/I
ITEM: HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
v)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (1)
HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY (3R, 3SB)
HYRAULIC BRAKE
CR_TI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: INTERNAL SPLINE OR SHAFT SHEARED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RSB. (BRAKE IS SET ONLY IF HYDRAULIC PRESSURE IS LOST.)
SHEARED SPLINE OR SHAFT - NO RPM/TORQUE TO DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX.
DIFFERENTIAL BACK DRIVES NO OUTPUT TO MIXER GEAR BOX. NOTE: IF
A HYD. FAILURE OCCURRED & THE MOTOR DRIVESHAFT WAS
FREE TO ROTATE, THE ACTION OF THE OTHER 2 GOOD MOTORS THROUGH THE
DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX WOULD DRIVE THE BAD ONE IN REVERSE_-I-T-WOULD
TRY TO ACT LIKE A HYD. PUMP AND THIS IN TURN WOULD TRANSMIT AN
OPPOSITE TORQUE INTO THE GEARBOX.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
129 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
OPEN - NO RPM/TORQUE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (I)
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX (IR, ISB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: ONE OF THREE SPLINED SHAFTS DISENGAGES, SPLINE OR GEAR
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEARBOX SUMS 3 MOTOR TORQUES TO SINGLE OUTPUT SHAFT TO DRIVE
MIXER GEARBOX. LOSS OF OUTPUT - LOSS OF CONTROL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
suBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
130 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
DIFFERENTIAL OUTPUT JAM
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (i)
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX (1R, 1SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [_A ] C [_ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUM BER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER _
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: GEAR MESH JAMMED BY BROKEN TOOTH, SEIZED BEARING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OUTPUT TO MIXER - LOSS OF CONTROL.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
REDUCED TORQUE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RSB SERV0 ACTUATOR
PDU (I)
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX (IR, ISB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: JAM ONE SET OF GEARS OF ONE DIFFERENTIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
JAMS 2 MOTORS - i MOTOR PROVIDE OUTPUT AT 1/2 RATE.
OTHER MOTOR - CAUSE LOSS OF RSB CONTROL.
LOSS OF
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 132 ABORT:
ITEM: SUMMER DIFFEREN_AL GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED - 1 INPUT SHAFT
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
?)
S)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (i)
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX (1R, ISB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: GEAR MESH JAMMED SEIZED BEARING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - 2 MOTORS DRIVE AT FULL RATE. 2ND FAILURE/MOTOR DRIVE AT
i/2 RATE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: _B FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 133 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/l
i/i
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
POSITION T_SDUCER
_SS OF OUTPUT (ALL T_SDUCERS)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WI_ON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (1)
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX (IR, 1SB)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT
P__CH: 3/ 3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
i/1
i/1
i/I
i/I
_D_ANCY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: SHE--D S_FT; DRIVE T_IN FAIL_ (GEM S_FT TO X-
DUCER S_FT) .....
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
_SS OF INP_ TO ASA'S. _SS OF RSB CONTROL. NOTE: _SULT OF 102
T_DO_-RI FO_D T_T AN INTE_AL BOLT _ICH HOLDS THE ASSY
TOGETHER, _D A _CK WASHER WITH TAB T_T PEEPS BOLT FROM BACKING
OFF HAD A C_CK.
(IF TAB FELL OFF COULD JAM X-DUCER (i/i CRIT). RI (SUNST_D) _S
GONE TO ERB PROPOSING A?IX'WILL P_SENT A NASA CCB FOR GO-_EAD
APPROVAL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 134 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: POSITION TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (ONE OF FOUR OUTPUTS)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
PDU (1)
SUMMER DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX (1R, ISB)
CRITICALITIES_
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B IF] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: OPEN COIL, LEAD, FAULTY X-DUCER, DRIFT, ELECTRICAL
SHORT, OPEN IN ASA. _ ........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE - FAILURE MODE IS 3/IR.
CREW/VEHICLE IF UNDETECTED.
2 ASA FAILURES CAN REULT IN LOSS OF
ASA FAILURE MODE IS 2/IR.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
135 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MIXER GEARBOX (I)
NO OUTPUT, BOTH SHAFTS
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
2) PDU (i)
3) MIXER GEARBOX (I)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: -3/3 AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO: I/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: OPEN/JAMMED ONE/BOTH SHAFTS, GEAR FRACTURE PARTS LODGED
IN GEAR ME_H, SEIZED BEARINGS ..... <_.....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RSB FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 136 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM: GEAR ROTARY ACTUATOR (4)
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
2) GEAR ROTARY ACTUATOR (4)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: I/1
3/3 TAL: i/i
3/3 AOA: 1/1
i/1 ATO: i/1
3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VERTICAL STABILIZER
MC621-0053-0049, 0040, 0041, 0042
CAUSES: BROKEN TEETH, PART LODGED IN GEAR MESH, SEIZED BEARINGS,
CONTAMINATION LOSS OF LUBRICANT MATERIAL DEFECT, MANUFACTURING
DEFECT, FRACTURED SHAFT (FATIGUE, OVERLOAD)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FUNCTION. LOSS OF RSB. LOSS OF CONTROL.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
RSB FLIGHT:
137 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVE SHAFTS
OPEN, NO POWER TRANSMISSION
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) RSB SERVO ACTUATOR
2) DRIVE SHAFTS (i0)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY S_S: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053
CAUSES: ALL TEETH SHEARED ON SPLINE, SHEARED BOLT, SHEARED
RIVETS, S_D SHAFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRANSFERS RPM/TORQUE BETWEEN PDU AND ROTARY ACTUATORS AND BETWEEN
ROTARY ACTUATORS. LOSS OF FUNCTION. LOSS OF CONTROL.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RSB FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 138 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/l
I/i
ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL GEAR BOX
FAILURE MODE: INPUT SHAFT FROM IST DIFFERENTIAL TO 2ND
DIFFERENTIAL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: R. WILSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) RUDDER/SPEEDBRAKE SERVO ACTUATOR
2) POWER DRIVE UNIT
3) DIFFERENTIAL GEAR BOX
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBI T: i/1 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: VERTICAL STABILIZER
PART NUMBER: MC621-0053-0048
CAUSES: SPLINED SHAFT DISENGAGES, SPLINE OR GEAR FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONTROL. LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW . 2ND DIFFERENTIAL
BACKDRIVES FROM ONE REMAINING INPUT SINCE THERE IS NO RESTRAINING
TORQUE. NO OUTPUT FROM DIFFERENTIAL TO MIXER GEARBOX.
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
J
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MDAC-ID
i01
102
103
105
ii0
ill
114
ll5
116
117
118
119
123
124
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
ITEM
PDU
PDU
PDU
Filter
Switching Valve
Switch Valve
Servovalve
Servovalve
Servovalve
Torque Motor Assembly
Torque Motor Assembly
Secondary delta-P
Transducer
Power Valve
Hydraulic Motor
Hydraulic Brake
Hydraulic Brake
Hydraulic Brake
Summer Differential
Summer Differential
Summer Differential
Summer Differential
Position Transducer
Position Transducer
Mixer Gearbox
Drive Shaft
Rotary Actuator
Summer Differential
FAILURE MODE
Gross fluid loss, 3 systems
Gross fluid loss, 1 system
Internal leak
Clogged
Secondary spool fails to switch
Primary spool fails to switch
Fails at null
Fails to return to null
No or erroneous output
Motor fails, open/short, loss
of signal
Flapper broken
Loss of or erroneous output
(I of 4)
Fails open/closed
Open
Fails to brake
Fails to release
Open
Open
Output Jammed
Partial Jam
Jam, 1 input shaft
Fall all 4
Loss of erroneous output
(i of 4)
Open; Jammed
Open
Jammed
First differential shaft-open
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